Bangladesh Poll Won't Count As Real Unless All Parties Are Allowed To Take Part: Ex-Envoy | Exclusive

Last Updated:November 29, 2025, 10:39 IST

In an interview with CNN-News18, Veena Sikri said at present, Bangladesh looks more like an authoritarian shell than a functioning democracy

Former Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh Veena Sikri. (X)

Bangladesh is in the throes of one of its most chaotic political moments in decades, with the once-dominant Awami League now barred from contesting the upcoming elections. The streets are tense, the institutions look shaken, and the uncertainty has spilled into every layer of society.

Speaking to CNN-News18, former Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh Veena Sikri broke down what the turbulence really means, speaking candidly about why the polls already look rigged, how minority groups in Dhaka are bracing through the unrest, the real weight the Bangladesh Army now holds, and whether Washington’s shadow is flickering behind the agitation.

As Bangladesh’s former prime minister Sheikh Hasina remains in India, Sikri also laid out how her presence could redefine the long-term arc of Delhi-Dhaka ties.

Edited Excerpts:

How do you assess the legitimacy and stability of the Yunus-led interim government, especially given its sweeping actions against the previous regime?

The interim government lacks full constitutional legitimacy. The Bangladeshi Constitution does not permit an interim administration of this kind, and the caretaker model is supposed to be a short 90-day arrangement run by non-political experts whose only job is to maintain order and prepare for elections. Instead, this government is packed with openly political Islamist actors, including members of Islami Andolan Bangladesh, Hefazat-e-Islam, and even individuals linked to banned groups.

Dr Yunus himself publicly described the change of power as “meticulously designed" and identified his own aide, Mahfuz Alam, who has ties to Hizb ut-Tahrir, as the architect. That alone raises questions about intent, transparency, and legality.

There’s also the violence that accompanied the power shift: hundreds of policemen killed, over 400 police stations attacked or looted, and weapons used in the unrest that did not belong to police armouries. None of these incidents have been addressed, compensated, or even acknowledged by those in power. The families of slain officers have been left without answers. At the same time, the government has banned the Awami League’s activities, something unheard of in functioning democracies. Even in Sri Lanka or Nepal, where governments fell under public pressure, ruling parties were not banned from contesting fresh elections. In Bangladesh’s case, the ban directly undermines the credibility of any democratic process.

The interim administration also shaped the mandate of the UN human rights inquiry to cover only a short window, leaving out the wave of attacks on minorities that followed.

Taken together, these decisions raise serious doubts about the interim government’s constitutional basis, democratic intent, and overall stability. Ultimately, the real test will be whether Bangladesh can now hold free, fair, inclusive elections, and whether all major political forces, including the Awami League, are genuinely allowed to participate.

So, given the recent protests by minority groups, what is the present condition of Hindus in Bangladesh, and do you see their vulnerability increasing during this period of political uncertainty?

Unfortunately, yes, minorities are far more vulnerable today. The violence began almost immediately after Sheikh Hasina left, with Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and even Sufi communities facing targeted attacks. Rights groups documented nearly 2,000 incidents in just two weeks, much of it aimed at pushing minorities out of their homes and livelihoods.

What’s different this time is that many young Hindus have stood their ground, insisting they are citizens and won’t be driven out. Yet the state response has been deeply worrying. Community organisers like Chinmay Das are in jail without charge. Many Awami League workers and journalists are also behind bars, trials are stalled or non-existent, and the media space has been brought under tight control.

On top of the violence, there’s economic exclusion. Hindu teachers, civil servants, and police officers are being forced to resign under mob pressure. Entire families are suddenly without income. And all of this is happening with almost no international scrutiny, even though global outlets loudly question democratic norms in other countries in the region.

Institutionally, Bangladesh is in a vacuum. Parliament is dissolved, the judiciary is being used as a political tool, and the media has been muzzled. The so-called July Charter barely has support among political parties, yet the government is pushing ahead with elections that exclude most major players. It’s hard to call this anything but an authoritarian setup, and minorities inevitably end up paying the highest price.

You highlighted the collapse of democratic norms and the rising threats to minorities. With the political scene so fluid, what does a realistic election roadmap even look like now, and who really gains from the legal cases being pushed through?

Right now, the roadmap looks foggy at best. For months, the interim government showed no real interest in holding elections and kept pointing to endless “reform committees" as a reason to delay the process indefinitely. Even the BNP, which should have been the natural alternative after the Awami League’s exit, is being pushed out, and the recent student-body polls made it obvious that the field is being tilted heavily towards Jamaat-linked groups.

There’s still no election date, even though the window is already open. The fear is that the system is being engineered to deliver a Jamaat-friendly outcome, not a genuinely competitive vote.

Unless all parties are allowed to participate, unless observers are allowed in, and unless the process is credible, it won’t count as a real election. Right now, the only steady constitutional figures left are the President and the Army Chief, and much will depend on whether they steer things back towards a proper democratic process.

With the sudden power shift in Dhaka, how much influence is the Bangladesh Army really exercising behind the facade of the interim government?

From what we’ve seen, the army is keeping a careful distance, at least publicly, but it’s clear there’s tension inside the institution. The army chief has largely stuck to the constitutional line and refused to let the force be dragged into political street battles, whether during the student protests or after the recent verdict against Sheikh Hasina. But there have been troubling exceptions—like the incident in Tungipara where a local commander opened fire, and a civilian died. That episode rattled people and exposed cracks within the ranks.

There have also been moments where parts of the armed forces division seemed to act directly under Yunus’s interim setup, including conversations around a so-called humanitarian corridor with Myanmar. Each time, the army chief had to step in and push back, insisting on sovereignty and distancing the institution from political adventurism. So yes, the army’s influence is real, but it’s not unified. There’s a clear internal split, even if the top brass is trying to keep the force above the political fray.

So, do you believe Washington has played a covert role in Bangladesh’s unrest, especially after Sheikh Hasina’s son, now in the US, claimed the Biden administration funded groups involved in the anti-government riots?

Her son’s claims aren’t coming out of nowhere. Even Donald Trump once questioned why millions were being spent on “trainings" in South Asia through USAID. That fed into long-standing allegations of US-backed “colour revolutions" in Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka and Nepal have since moved back toward open, competitive politics. Bangladesh is the outlier. The interim leadership keeps drifting further from democratic norms, talking up reforms, referendums, committees, anything that delays real elections. Even their push for a July Charter referendum has been blocked by the President, who insists it must coincide with national polls, meaning no elections, no referendum.

At this point, the only real fix is simple: free, fair, inclusive elections. If that happens, the outcome could go to anyone—BNP, Awami League, a coalition—whoever the people trust after the past year-and-a-half. But without that credibility, instability will continue, no matter who wins on paper.

If Hasina remains in India, how might this reshape the long-term India-Bangladesh equation, especially with China waiting to expand its footprint in Dhaka?

Sending Sheikh Hasina back wouldn’t end the crisis; it would trigger a bigger one. A huge section of Bangladesh still believes in the spirit of the liberation war and wants a secular, democratic, economically forward-looking country. They may be religious, but they don’t want a Pakistan-style model. And India can’t ignore that, because Jamaat-e-Islami’s ideology is fundamentally opposed to India’s interests.

If Bangladesh slides back into that space, India will eventually face the same terrorism debate all over again. Are we going to call terrorism from Pakistan an act of war but pretend it’s different when it comes from Bangladesh? The truth is, most Bangladeshis don’t support Jamaat-e-Islami or Muhammad Yunus. If they did, the government could easily hold a free, inclusive election and still win. But they know they can’t, which is why they’re stalling, distracting, and talking about extradition instead of democracy. And extradition isn’t some quick political hack. It’s a legal process bound by treaty. Mishandle it, and India risks international complications.

More importantly, pushing Hasina back without a political settlement would inflame tensions because ordinary Bangladeshis expect India to stand by the values of 1971. They expect India to defend the very principles they fought for. That’s why this moment is bigger than one leader. It’s about what kind of Bangladesh its people want—and what India chooses to support.

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