Exclusive: Why is India Reluctant to engage with Chabahar Port? Seyed Emamian Answers

India and Iran’s connection dates back centuries, marked by cultural exchanges and mutual trade. In the modern era, this bond has evolved into a strategic partnership with a focus on energy cooperation and regional connectivity. The Chabahar Port project exemplifies this collaboration, serving as a crucial gateway to Central Asia. It not only strengthens India’s economic foothold but also underscores both nations' commitment to fostering regional stability.

However, this promising partnership faces significant obstacles. US sanctions on Iran have curtailed trade and investment opportunities, forcing India to tread cautiously. Balancing its relationships with both the U.S. and Iran has often put New Delhi in a delicate position. The interplay of these factors highlights the complexities of maintaining strong bilateral ties amidst competing international interests.

In an exclusive conversation with India Today Global, Geeta Mohan, our Executive Editor, engaged with Sayeed Emamian, a renowned Iranian expert, to unravel the nuances of India-Iran relations. Against the backdrop of West Asia tensions, their discussion highlighted how historical ties and geopolitical realities continue to shape this vital partnership.

Question: Are we seeing new developments in their relationship? And much more. Imamian Sa’ad, thank you so much for joining us on the network. Let us begin with the conflict itself. We are witnessing conflict at a time when there is about to be a new presidency in the United States. With Donald Trump’s election victory, how is Tehran positioned? How is it viewing a Trump presidency in the context of Israel?

Syed Emamian: First of all, thank you for inviting me. Regarding the conflict, it has entered a new phase since early October. The level of aggression demonstrated by Netanyahu and his administration has been unprecedented. Since October 7th, we have seen two prevailing perspectives: one that views the events of October 7th as a legitimate reaction to seven years of genocide, and another that regards it as an unprecedented terrorist attack. Regardless of these perspectives, the Criminal Court (ICC) and the Court of Justice (ICJ) have recognised that Israel is continuing to commit genocide and ethnic cleansing in the region.

Even amidst this, significant figures in the region have been committed to a “calibrated war” – a rational and non-escalatory approach. For example, the late Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah was committed to this strategy, maintaining a rule-based and localised conflict.

Question: Israel would strongly disagree, arguing that Hezbollah’s leader caused significant damage to them.

Syed Emamian: Hezbollah made it very clear, as per their statements, that their actions were limited to supporting the Palestinian people. Their stance was that they would cease fighting the moment Israel stopped its genocide in Gaza. Nasrallah was widely criticised for adhering to a calibrated war strategy, but his assassination revealed the risks of miscalculating Israel’s aggression. Netanyahu’s administration appears to have no limits.

With this new phase of war, no one is left to manage or contain the escalation. Consequently, Israel is likely to pursue an unrestrained war, and the region will have to adapt to this reality. Regarding Trump’s re-election, one defining trait of Trump’s presidency is unpredictability. His electoral campaign is sharply polarised between two factions: the “America First” base and the “Israel First” donors, many of whom are significant financial backers.

Question: Do you see any faction within Trump’s America First or Israel First camp that might advocate for Iran? Trump has historically been anti-Iran, as evidenced by his withdrawal from the JCPOA.

Syed Emamian: It is not about Iran specifically but Trump’s broader strategy. The America First faction prefers Trump to focus on domestic issues, such as national security and border control, rather than pursuing aggressive foreign wars. On the other hand, the Israel First faction, influenced by figures like Miriam Adelson, prioritises Israeli interests.

However, Trump’s personal stance remains unpredictable. His appointments, such as the US envoy to Israel and his special envoy to West Asia, indicate a clear alignment with Israel. This raises concerns about how Iran, Palestine, Gaza, and Lebanon will be impacted.

Question: You’ve made an important point: Trump’s appointments reveal his leanings and the direction of his policies. Given that the US has historically supported Israel, does it matter whether it is Trump or Biden in power?

Syed Emamian: The US has always supported Israel, irrespective of who occupies the White House. Without Biden’s support, Israel might not have endured even a few weeks after October 7th. However, the critical question is whether Trump will escalate the war or push for a ceasefire. There are even divisions within Israel, with some suggesting that a ceasefire may now be more advantageous than continued conflict.

Question: You mentioned earlier that Iran is rethinking its policies. How is Iran altering its strategy in response to these developments?

Syed Emamian: Iran is now preparing for the possibility of a fully regional war, where no nation, even those attempting neutrality or normalisation with Israel, would remain untouched. Such a war would have global repercussions, especially for emerging economies like China and India, which depend heavily on the region’s resources and markets. If war breaks out, it could cause an energy crisis and supply chain disruptions far worse than those experienced during COVID-19.

Question: Are you suggesting that Trump, despite his pro-Israel stance, might advocate for peace and negotiations rather than war?

Syed Emamian: That is a possibility. Trump might begin his presidency by pursuing quick resolutions in both the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian escalation. However, his unpredictability remains a key characteristic.

Question: The hostage crisis and ceasefire offers have stagnated, with Netanyahu rejecting previous proposals and making fresh ones concerning Gaza. What is your analysis of Netanyahu’s current strategy?

Syed Emamian: Netanyahu’s aggression appears limitless. His long-held dream has been to involve the US directly in this conflict. This is his primary strategy to expand the war and ensure US engagement. Thomas Friedman’s predictions about Netanyahu’s political tactics have proven accurate – war remains Netanyahu’s tool to sustain his political survival. Continuing the conflict and involving other players may even increase his chances of re-election. Netanyahu’s pursuit of a war-driven political strategy is both calculated and dangerous.

Question: So, one thing is very interesting. You know, when we look at West Asia and the entire geopolitics and how it has played out with the war, we see that Iran, a Shia nation, has come out in support of Palestine more than the Arab world. Why so? Where's the reluctance over here of the Arab world coming into the mainframe? We do know that, you know, they are strategic partners of the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. But isn't the Palestinian cause big enough to unite the Muslim world?

Syed Emamian: To be honest, first of all, Iran-Arab relations have improved very well since last year through the very important mediation of China. The Iran-Saudi deal has gone very well with regards to the security and political relationship. Of course, there is still some lag in economic relationships. I'm sure you have heard about clear statements from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Once the Israeli IDF attacked very selectively in specific parts of Iranian territory, all of them clearly condemned Israel's aggression. That’s true.

So now we are in a very specific political context where Iran-Arab relations are in a very good situation. But at the same time, we need to differentiate between what Arab governments—most of which are non-democratic—are thinking and their policies, and what the nations and the people are thinking.

Based on the polls that have been published by international institutions, even 96% of the Saudi Arabian people are clearly against any likely normalisation. So, the Arab and the whole Muslim countries are very much against Israel. But the Israeli aggression and genocide is not only a Shia, Muslim, or Arab issue. It’s a global issue.

You have seen huge demonstrations across the world. It’s a matter of humanity and something unprecedented happening in front of the digital media and social networks. The genocide and ethnic cleansing happening every day is something that has never been seen before in the history of humanity.

So, it’s more of a global issue rather than a specific Palestinian, Arab, or Muslim issue. That’s the situation. But with regards to policies, countries have played different roles in that conflict. Everyone should know that what is happening now in the region is a very historical period of time. It’s a turning point—not only for the peace, prosperity, and connectivity of the region but also for its economic growth. I think it’s a political turning point for the region.

The people are very much outraged. The level of genocidal operations happening in front of cameras and mobile phones is unprecedented. Everything is being broadcast live. So, it’s very clear now. It’s a turning point for the region, the Arab world, and humanity as a whole.

Question: You're in Delhi. So, you've had your own set of meetings and engagements in Delhi. Tell us about where Iran and India stand. Where do relations between the two countries really stand at this point in time, when we are seeing a lot of pressure on India from the West when it comes to Iran? In such a scenario, are we moving ahead? Where is New Delhi when it comes to Tehran and the position on the Israel-Hamas war?

Syed Emamian: With regards to Iran-India relations, it’s not something new. We have civilisational interactions with each other. Both countries have a lot in common—history, culturally rich societies, very pluralised, tolerant societies. Also, we have been in touch for a long period of time in a very good political situation.

Iran-India relations have been strategic since the independence of India and since the convention that was signed in the 1950s. Now, we are still moving ahead. The only problem has been the US unilateral coercive measures. We don’t call them legitimate sanctions—UCL—that the US has imposed on Iran-India relations. These have affected Iran-India economic trade, particularly oil and energy trade.

It has affected that a lot. We have been discussing with all Indian friends in think tanks and policy-making venues. We think that Iran has lived with sanctions for decades as an independent analyst. Otherwise, I think part of the problem lies with Iranian incompetence. Sometimes, Iranian authorities are not competent enough to provide a platform for enhancing economic and trade relations. But some of the problem also lies with India’s over-compliance with US sanctions—US unilateral sanctions.

What does that mean? Indian colleagues always ask me whether there is any exception. I say, yes. From Iran’s point of view, just compare India-Iran relations with China-Iran relations. The Chinese have been very keen. From the Indian point of view, we have seen India continuing to trade and maintain economic relations with Russia, even with the most important sanctions imposed on Russia by both American and European counterparts, which are very close to India. But India has been very clear since then that it’s an independent Indian decision to continue working with Russia.

Question: Then where are the problem areas when it comes to Iran and India? We know that Chabahar Port is very important, but are there niggling issues? Is this a path we see continuing? Is this a commitment we will see continuing between the two countries, or are there problems?

Syed Emamian: The good news is that, again, as someone who is not representing anyone, I have talked to both Iranian policymakers and decision-makers and Indian policymakers and decision-makers. I found both parties very keen to continue working with each other, particularly to make the Chabahar project a success story. They have already extended it. In May, just a few weeks before the Iranian late president crash happened, they signed a contract for the next 10 years. That’s good news.

But the challenging part goes to both parties—Iranian incompetency and bureaucratic inefficiency, and also Indian lack of what we call political will. That means Indians need to be more ambitious and competent to bring about operational development at the scale and timeframe that is needed and expected.

Question: You're saying they’re slow? Is it because of sanctions or otherwise?

Syed Emamian: Yes, it’s because of a few things. First of all, sanctions again, and also the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, because India is always thinking about the North Sea Corridor as a route to Central Asia and Russia. The rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan has also affected India’s ambition. India has always thought about Chabahar in the context of accessing Afghanistan. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan a few years ago has also impacted India’s ambitions.

Exemptions that the US literally provided for Chabahar have also been a factor. A more important aspect is critical views inside Iran. Iran has a very diversified society. Some groups are very much in support of Indian involvement in Chabahar and see it as an important, strategic, and iconic project that needs to succeed. They think Chabahar is the only unique way for India to access Central Asia—there is no other corridor providing such access for India.

But some are very critical—not just technical criticisms about slowness and delays in the project, but also strategic criticisms. There are questions about whether or not India is thinking of IMEC as an alternative corridor to the North Sea, or whether or not India has politically prioritised IMEC under pressure from Israel and US lobbies over Chabahar and the North-South Corridor.

Indian counterparts and policymakers have clearly stated that these are two different projects with different philosophies, rationale, and economic analyses behind them.

Question: Even geopolitically, for India, Chabahar is important to counter Gwadar and China sitting in Gwadar.

Syed Emamian: That is part of some pessimistic analysis happening now inside Iranian corridors and media. Sometimes, they think India’s involvement in Chabahar is just to contain China’s investment. But that’s a very pessimistic view.

I have always said here, in India and in Delhi, when invited by different think tanks, research institutions, and media channels like you, that it’s very important for India and Iran to expand their relationship beyond official diplomatic relations. Two societies are very big, very diverse, and we need to have more people-to-people interaction.

My role as an independent analyst, think tanker, and academic professor is to provide a good analysis of what is happening inside Iranian intellectual circles—who supports India-Iran relations and who is critical. I’ve told the Iranian ambassador here that part of this project is to get in touch with Iranian intellectual society and convince them that the India-Iran and Chabahar projects are in the interest of both societies.

Question: But is China waiting in the wings? Is China waiting to get into the Chabahar project?

Syed Emamian: Again, I don’t have any specific news. But to be honest, that’s always the case. For Iran-China relations as well, in 2021, when the Iran-China 25-year strategic agreement was signed, there was huge media controversy around whether or not a strategic partnership with China benefits Iran.

I have told Chinese friends and counterparts that it’s also their responsibility to talk to Iranian intellectual society—not just sign agreements behind the scenes with diplomats and politicians.

This is why independent analysts and think tanks from Iran and India always try to keep in touch—not representing any political party or department, but talking frankly and transparently to each other. This is part of what we call intellectual diplomacy, which is very much needed.

Otherwise, even very important strategic projects that have been politically signed by both countries could be challenged by the societies involved.

Question: But will it be challenged by the other country? Like if it’s signed with India, will China challenge it if India does not move fast enough?

Syed Emamian: Of course, yes, of course. There is some economic competition and rivalry—it’s clear. And also, both countries, even other countries, have some lobbies inside Iran. What happened with the China-Iran agreement in 2021 was very much fuelled by, I think, Western-oriented lobbies and media inside Iran because it was heavily challenged by the US, first of all. The US was very much concerned about the Iran-China agreement for a 25-year strategic partnership. So, a lot of media channels started attacking the agreement, just based on some kind of international lobbies.

It happens everywhere with diverse, to some extent open, societies in different contexts. We have these kinds of things. And so, I’m always saying to colleagues in different countries, India, China—I know about the Chinese-Indian competition—but from an Iranian point of view, we are very keen to work with both. That intellectual diplomacy is important. We need society-to-society interaction rather than just political interaction.

Question: Final question before I let you go. Apart from the fact that India and Iran have been very close, there has been certain criticism that has come India’s way from Iran as well, especially to do with the government and the minorities here. What do you make of that? Why were those statements made, especially by the Supreme Leader?

Syed Emamian: As I said, we are living in a very diverse world. Right? Diverse and complex societies and a very important period of time. There are a lot of things that both countries may agree or disagree on. But we have seen how India has interacted with, and kept working with, Israelis. It has always been challenging for the Iranians. India’s approach towards the October 7th operation, while India has been fairly committed to the two-state solution, included a statement that characterised October 7th as a terrorist attack—something viewed differently from the Iranian perspective.

But we need to tolerate differences and different points of view while we recognise that the Iran-India relationship is very strategic. It’s clear. Just yesterday, I met the Iranian ambassador here. It was the first time, and I’m here as an independent analyst. But he was kind and shared a very specific story. He mentioned having the opportunity to meet the Supreme Leader very shortly. He emphasised that it’s his job to enhance the Iran-India strategic relationship. The Ambassador told me he asked for the Supreme Leader’s support, and the response was that he fully supports enhancing relations with India. It’s clear—that’s the policy.

Syed Emamian: But things may happen. Some disagreements, some concerns, as you mentioned, about internal issues. Some of them are important for India, and some of them are for Iran. It’s natural. But strategically, it’s clear for both parties that the Iran-India relationship is not only strategic but also civilisationally rooted.

So, no one could think about Iran and India being disconnected from each other or being, to some extent, geopolitical enemies or rivals. The current political situation is improving, and both countries are very keen, as far as I have heard from policymakers from both Iran and India.