Navigating West Asia: Irina Tsukerman on Trump's 100-day peace plan and foreign policy imperatives

In the evolving geopolitical landscape, the dynamics of West Asia and the strategic interplay involving Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, and the United States are increasingly complex. India Today Global sat down with Irina Tsukerman, security and human rights lawyer, and Fellow, Jerusalem Centre for Security and Foreign Affairs, to talk about the 100-day peace plan and foreign policy imperatives of Donald Trump presidency.

1. It does seem like a lot of things are going to change because there is a change in administration in Washington DC. What do you anticipate is going to happen in the coming months?

The first 100 days are going to be crucial in terms of foreign policy. President-elect Trump has emphasised his intention to settle the wars in the Middle East and in Ukraine. However, the first signs show that it may be more difficult than it appears. Russia immediately attacked Ukraine and denied even having a phone call with Trump regarding this issue. During the course of the call, Trump asked the Kremlin not to escalate in Ukraine as his inauguration nears. He also expressed interest in two of the points from President Zelensky's victory plan, which was communicated to the Biden administration. In terms of the wars in the Middle East, they too are appearing more difficult to settle than what meets the eye. He has previously asked Israel to wrap up military operations in Gaza and Lebanon in time for his inauguration, but his newly nominated officials all appear to be fairly hardline on Hamas, and they may be more supportive of extended operations should the issues in question not be resolved by that point. This means, of course, the release of hostages by Hamas, which remains a red line for Israel as well as the cessation of attacks on Israel's northern borders by Hezbollah, which likewise has not ceased in the past.

2. You said the 100-day plan or the first 100 days could look difficult for President Trump in implementing what he calls a peace plan or bringing about peace in West Asia. Why do you say that? Why do you think it's going to be difficult?

The situation on the ground has changed. Trump's model of diplomacy is extremely personal. It's focused, first of all, more on bilateral relations than multilateral frameworks, and second, on the role of personal relations such as his own or, in the past, Jared Kushner's, with the officials and top-ranking leaders of countries. I think during this first term in office, the situation on the ground was different. Russia and Ukraine were not involved in war for over two years, which means the positions of both parties are fairly entrenched. Ukraine is fighting for survival; it is an existential threat. Russia, through its former President Medvedev, has communicated that it is not interested in territorial concessions but rather in advancing its geopolitical goals in taking over Ukraine. In terms of the Middle East too, the situation is more concerning. Iran has normalised relations with many of the Arab states that were part of the prospective defence alliance against Iran during Trump's first term in office. China is playing a far greater political, not just financial and economic, role in the Middle East. The internal dynamics in the Arab countries have also changed, particularly after October 7th. There is a sense of polarisation and tensions between Israel and some of these countries, which complicates peace efforts and multilateral cooperation, and which will also make it difficult to use personal diplomacy to address these issues.

3. Very interesting points, but let's just focus on Netanyahu for a bit. There's staunch support we've seen coming from President Trump when it comes to Prime Minister Netanyahu. Do you think that support will extend to the extent that we will see a lot more support and aid going to Israel without any explanation that was given earlier by the Democrats on humanitarian issues, humanitarian concerns, and so on? Trump made it very clear that whoever criticises Israel is free to leave the United States of America, and if he follows through on that policy, it seems like Netanyahu will finally get his way in how he wants to deal with Gaza and the West Bank.

I disagree. First of all, Trump himself was the first to criticise Netanyahu personally and Israel's operations in general throughout his campaign. That said, I do think he would be more pragmatic in addressing security issues, which remain a major obstacle to effective delivery of humanitarian aid. I also think that as someone who has had a history of more positive relations with the Arab countries, he would be more effective in creating political dialogue that could resolve these concerns diplomatically rather than putting Israel in an isolated and defensive posture vis- -vis the pressure from these countries. In that sense, he could actually overcome some of the differences between the U.S. and Israel that we saw under the Biden administration.

4. You do think that Trump wields more influence and has a greater rapport with leaders from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other important countries in the Arab world. Is that the reason why you think there could be a move to come to the table and talk peace?

At the very least, there could be an opening. That said, there are still many complications that lie outside Trump's immediate control, which, as I mentioned, include changing political dynamics inside those countries and the involvement of third-party actors, which was not nearly as pronounced four years ago when Trump was leaving office. I think those obstacles could make it difficult to restore trust and rebuild relations with those countries, even though Trump's team is much more likely to have, on a personal level, a better dynamic and may be coming in with more things to offer rather than just pressure or threats, as the Biden administration started out with toward those states.

5. Right. Then what is your reading on the normalisation of ties that you mentioned between Iran and various countries? Particularly now, we're seeing meetings, conversations, and engagement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, with China as the mediator. Are we looking at maybe an isolation of the West in a scenario where things have become complicated because of the United States?

Indeed, China has jumped on any vacuum of U.S. absence in the region. Unfortunately, Trump did not help in that respect during his term in office, as he virtually ignored China's growing economic activity in the region, instead pursuing parallel deals that were very transactional and did not cover any issues outside bilateral U.S.-Saudi relations. The Saudis also expressed disappointment after the U.S. failed to prevent or address the Iran-backed Aramco attacks during Trump's term in office. China is being perceived, or at least presents itself, as a stabilising force. It has maintained good relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, has sold surveillance equipment to both countries, and has been very engaged in energy and construction and contracting issues, creating a strong presence on the ground. Meanwhile, U.S. presence has been decreasing, not only militarily but also in terms of businesses. A growing number of smaller businesses and contractors have left the country. Many deals are ongoing, and many American companies are traveling, but these are usually small, self-selected groups of top-tier companies that do not necessarily have a broad influence over the dynamic in projects such as Neom, which is a signature project of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, other countries in the region, such as the UAE, have also been fostering closer relations with both China and Russia, which has become a national security obstacle for defence cooperation over time. Trump will be hard-pressed to address these issues effectively.

6. When it comes to Saudi Arabia, what do you think is the reluctance? We know that Saudi Arabia has massive investments right now in New York City, which borders Israel. Therefore, they have been reluctant to have a full-blown situation of war in West Asia. This could be one of the reasons for their reluctance. Could you explain how important Neom City is for Saudi Arabia and why they've stayed away from directly getting involved in a conflict where what they say would really matter because this is the Palestinian cause?

Well, there are a few things going on. From an economic perspective, of course, it’s hugely important to the Saudis. It involves billions, many billions of dollars in investments. It was supposed to be, however, an opportunity to bring countries closer together. Its original concept was developed at the peak of discussions about the Abraham Accords, where Israel was among those who would have benefited from the opening that it presented. It would have drawn Israel and Arab Gulf states closer together in terms of project coordination. That opportunity seems to be shrinking, but Neom’s economic importance to Saudi Arabia remains significant. It’s been a signature project for them to attract investments and to push their economic model in Vision 2030. The international community, although now less Western-oriented than when it first started, is now managed by people closer to China than to the U.S.

Outside Neom, there are, of course, security concerns. The Houthis had previously attacked Saudi Arabia and the UAE multiple times, and even recently, despite ongoing peace talks with the Houthis over the past two years, there have been incidents and attacks that required a response. Iran has also openly threatened Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region with potential attacks if they assist Israel in any way. With Trump coming into office, there are concerns about managing these relationships. On one hand, Saudi Arabia and Iran are benefiting from trade, or at least those involved in trade are benefiting. I wouldn’t say the overall relations between those countries have improved greatly. But officially, they view it as beneficial because it’s a source of financial income for parties engaged in these dealings, and they’re reluctant to back away from these commitments.

Saudis also see it as a potential security guarantee, which Iran effectively leverages. Iran is a much more decisive factor in this relationship. Why would that be the case when Iran is militarily weaker and Saudi Arabia is equipped with billions of dollars of top-notch U.S. equipment? The reason is that Iran has been extremely effective in penetrating societies beyond simply establishing military control through proxies. It has previously caused disorder in Saudi Arabia by aligning with radical factions, and it has formed relationships with assorted groups that could be reignited at any moment. This relationship with Iran is a sort of bear hug that has advantages for some, but overall, it isn’t necessarily a good sign for Saudi Arabia and its role in the region.

7. That’s a very interesting take, Ina. Not many people understand the layers and intricacies of why Saudi Arabia is behaving or acting in this manner and the Iran factor here. Having said that, you also mentioned that Trump was one of the first to criticise Israel’s actions, despite also saying he will stand by Israel. The reason I ask is that I’m curious about his pro-settlement picks: Mike Huckabee, former Arkansas governor, and Steven Witkoff as special envoy to the Middle East (West Asia). What do you make of these choices?

Both of these individuals are Trump loyalists and are perceived as very pro-Israel. Mike Huckabee is a strong religious voice in the United States. He has, in the past, called for the U.S. to prioritise Christianity as a national religion, for which he was described as a Christianist looking to establish theocratic norms in the U.S. However, his relationship with Israel has been very positive. The nominated envoy for the Middle East is also seen as a pro-Israel voice. He’s a real estate magnate from circles close to Trump, so there are strong business connections, reflecting Trump’s continued approach to the Middle East as a transactional, business-focused arena. The expansion of the Abraham Accords and other regional deals is seen as a sort of business arrangement that can be resolved by having effective businesspeople coordinate and create economic incentives for further cooperation. While Trump may be hopeful about strengthening the Accords, it raises questions about whether this type of person should be handling the complexity of political and military complications that were not present from 2017 to 2021 before Trump left office. Trump still seems somewhat stuck in the past, believing he can resolve issues by appointing people aligned with economic interests in the region, despite clear security challenges that someone with a real estate background may not be fully equipped to handle.

8. You mentioned the Abraham Accords, which leads to my next question. We saw the future of the Abraham Accords stall, especially after the war. Do you think Trump will bring them back on track after his entire plan was derailed, not only by the Biden administration but particularly because of the Israel-Hamas war?

I think he’ll try very hard to do so. He may make some strides in resuming dialogue on specific forms of cooperation and getting key players to the table. That is something he can do with a dedicated team. However, he cannot single-handedly resolve all the issues that have arisen. Returning to the status quo won’t be easy. The Gaza and Lebanon situations require a long-term, consistent approach. There needs to be a political paradigm for restructuring Gaza’s governance, ending not only terrorism but also the political support and instrumentalisation of these organisations. Iran’s growing role in the West Bank and other areas outside its control is as much political as it is military. There are also internal dynamics, with other players prioritising rivalries and competitions over the Abraham Accords or Israel.

During the peak of the Abraham Accords negotiations, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were closely cooperating on many issues, but they’ve since become competitors in various areas. Qatar, a major sponsor of Hamas ideologically opposed to the Accords, has been reintegrated into the GCC, playing a significant security and economic role that has affected the outlook of these countries. Additionally, Chinese, Russian, and Iranian political influence is more prominent now than during Trump’s first term, when China focused mainly on building economic relations and avoided political involvement in the Middle East. Now, it is a vocal player openly aligning with Hamas, not with the Palestinian people but with Hamas.

9. Again, very interesting. You spoke about Trump being transactional, and he has been. It benefits him to end the war so he can continue with his massive projects with the Arab world, which he can’t proceed with unless Israel stops its actions against the people in Gaza. Do you think Trump has the opportunity to become a peacemaker in West Asia or the Russia-Ukraine war, where he might force Russia and Ukraine back to the table? And if so, could he be seen as a major contender for the Nobel Peace Prize, as he often says he deserves more than anyone?

While it may be fair to say Trump hasn’t started these wars, he does have to deal with them. He might try to settle these conflicts, but he can only introduce leverage and incentives. He cannot unilaterally force countries to stop actions they view as essential to their geopolitical strategy or national security. Both Israel and Ukraine have strong popular support for their defensive actions, so it’s unlikely that leaders will stop defending their countries. The U.S. can deny aid, but that could damage its image if seen as abandoning allies and may worsen security issues. Trump will have to face that reality. He hasn’t received national security briefings due to procedural reasons in the U.S., so he may find it challenging to claim he can resolve these issues as quickly as he has in the past. Much will depend on whom he listens to in his administration. There are conflicting voices, including traditional grand strategists and anti-Russia, anti-China hawks, but also people like Elon Musk, who isn’t an official in geopolitics but is close to Trump. J.P., his vice president, has also been influential and is supported by Tucker Carlson, an isolationist who is openly pro-Russia and anti-Israel and anti-Ukraine.

10. I was just going to ask, does Trump have more influence than the Biden administration and will he wield more influence in the current wars, whether it's Russia-Ukraine or Israel-Hamas, since the Biden administration seemed almost helpless? Do you think Trump will be more effective?

In some ways, that’s already happening, as we see Europeans, including Norway, mobilising in response to concerns about Trump’s approach toward Ukraine and NATO by increasing aid more quickly. If that continues, it’s positive, especially if these countries use this opportunity to raise their defence spending, benefiting everyone. NATO is an incredibly important alliance. Trump may threaten to reduce assistance, but doing so would not serve anyone well. Part of the Biden administration’s problem was that it offered little when asking other countries for help, often insulting and criticising countries with differing governance. They focused on democracy and human rights excessively without addressing major offenders effectively. This double standard cost credibility and other countries want genuine cooperation, not just to be told what to do by the U.S. It’s a new era where countries engage financially with various players. While we’re in a bipolar world of China-led authoritarianism vs. U.S.-led democracy, the U.S. must uphold that vision with meaningful engagement rather than random self-selected processes.