Bangladesh On The Boil: Revisiting The Pakistani Army’s Campaign Of Violence And The Razakars

Last Updated:December 20, 2025, 11:29 IST

Dhaka’s deepening engagement with Islamabad, and the resurgence of radical groups have reopened long-buried tensions rooted in the Liberation War.

Violence broke out in Bangladesh after the death of radical student leader Sharif Osman Hadi. (Reuters)

Bangladesh’s unfolding political crisis is not merely a product of the last few months. The violent unrest following the killing of radical student leader Sharif Osman Hadi, the deepening Dhaka–Islamabad alignment and the renewed concerns in New Delhi about Pakistan’s intelligence footprint all sit atop a much older faultline.

It is a faultline that stretches back to 1971, when the Pakistan Army, aided by the Razakars and other Islamist militias, unleashed one of the worst campaigns of mass violence in South Asia.

The forces that enabled that brutality never fully disappeared. Instead, they re-entered Bangladesh at different moments over the decades, resurfaced within its politics and have now converged with the country’s fragile transition.

This long arc is essential to understanding why Bangladesh is in the eye of a geopolitical storm once again.

Who Were The Razakars?

The Razakars were an auxiliary force raised by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) during the Liberation War. Their origins trace back to an earlier iteration of paramilitary Razakars in the princely state of Hyderabad, who resisted integration with India after 1947. When India defeated the Hyderabad Razakars in Operation Polo, their leader, Qazim Rizvi, migrated to Pakistan, where the idea of mobilising “volunteers" for state-backed coercion found new life.

In East Pakistan, the first Razakar units were formed in May 1971 by Maulana Abul Kalam Muhammad Yusuf, a senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader, in Khulna. Their ranks were drawn from pro-Pakistan local supporters, Urdu-speaking Bihari Muslims who had migrated after the 1947 Partition, and socio-economically marginalised groups persuaded to back the Army.

They opposed the pro-independence movement and offered the Pakistan Army something it desperately needed: intimate local knowledge of villages, neighbourhoods, households and loyalties.

What Role Did The Razakars Play In The Atrocities Of 1971?

The Pakistan Army’s crackdown depended heavily on collaborators, and the Razakars became the most notorious among them. They were used to identify pro-independence households, track freedom fighters, point out Hindu neighbourhoods and guide military units into areas unfamiliar to West Pakistani soldiers.

Razakars participated directly in raids, forced disappearances, torture, lootings and extrajudicial executions. They became central to the mass rapes that scarred the war, with between 100,000 and 400,000 women subjected to sexual violence and up to 195,000 forced pregnancies.

Many of these assaults targeted Hindu women and families. Estimates of the civilian death toll range from 300,000 to 3 million. While exact figures remain a matter of debate, contemporary records describe razed villages, burned homes, mass graves and systematic targeting of intellectuals and minorities.

In Bangladesh, the word “Razakar" has since become one of the worst forms of slur, synonymous with treachery and brutality.

The Fragile Pursuit Of Justice After Liberation

After independence in December 1971, the new government banned organisations that had collaborated with Pakistan, including Jamaat-e-Islami. The Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order of 1972 and the Crimes (Tribunal) Act of 1973 created mechanisms to identify and punish wartime atrocities. Around 37,000 collaborators were identified, but in November 1973, approximately 26,000 were granted general amnesty. Trials continued for those accused of more serious crimes.

However, these attempts at accountability were interrupted by the assassination of the country’s founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in August 1975. With the ensuing military regimes came sweeping political changes.

How Were Razakar Networks Rehabilitated During Military Rule?

General Ziaur Rahman, who assumed power after Mujib’s assassination, repealed the Collaborators Act and released those imprisoned for war crimes. He allowed Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamic parties to return to public life. Figures previously denounced for opposing Bangladesh’s independence re-entered the political mainstream. Shah Azizur Rahman, a former Muslim League politician accused of collaborating with Pakistan, joined Zia’s newly formed Bangladesh ist Party and later became the country’s Prime Minister in 1979. Ghulam Azam, the former Jamaat-e-Islami chief who had opposed the liberation movement, also returned.

The political rehabilitation of these leaders allowed networks associated with Razakar-era groups to regain influence. During the 2001–06 coalition government led by the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami leaders again held key ministerial positions.

The Road To Accountability Under Sheikh Hasina

When Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League returned to power, they revived the process of wartime justice. In 2010, her government established the Crimes Tribunal to prosecute crimes committed during the Liberation War. In 2013, Abul Kalam Azad — known as Bachchu Razakar — became the first person convicted for murder, rape, arson and looting, largely targeted at the Hindu community. And in December 2019, on the eve of Bangladesh’s Victory Day, the government published an unprecedented list of 10,789 Razakars who had collaborated with the Pakistan Army.

The then Liberation War Affairs Minister AKM Mozammel Haque said the list was published so future generations would know the truth about the collaborators.

Why Do Analysts Say Pakistan ‘Never Left’ Bangladesh?

Pakistan’s sense of humiliation stemming from the 1971 defeat, including the surrender of 93,000 prisoners of war, shaped a long-term strategy of maintaining influence inside Bangladesh. Despite losing territorial control, Islamabad retained ideological, political and intelligence-linked networks through groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist organisations nurtured during the war.

Pakistani sleeper agents and ISI-linked channels remained embedded in Bangladesh for decades. China’s interest in India’s Northeast created further alignment with this strategy, resulting in what is described as a formidable influence lodged within sections of Bangladesh’s uniformed forces and political actors. These networks, although dormant at times, never disappeared.

These dormant networks formed the backdrop against which developments after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster unfolded.

Has Pakistan Re-Entered Bangladesh After The Fall Of Hasina?

What began as a diplomatic “thaw" following the fall of the Hasina government in August 2024 has rapidly evolved into a strategic re-entry, with New Delhi now raising red flags over a burgeoning Dhaka-Islamabad axis.

The most alarming development for regional security is the reported establishment of a dedicated ISI Special Cell within the Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka. First exposed by CNN-News18 in late October 2025, the unit is said to be heavily staffed by a team of high-ranking military and intelligence officers. According to top intelligence sources, the cell’s initial phase includes one Brigadier, two Colonels, four Majors, and several officials from Pakistan’s Navy and Air Force.

This infrastructure was reportedly formalised following the four-day visit of Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Sahir Shamshad Mirza, to Dhaka in late October 2025. During this tour, General Mirza and senior ISI officers held multiple rounds of closed-door meetings with Bangladesh’s Security Intelligence (NSI) and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI). Sources indicate that these meetings resulted in a joint intelligence-sharing mechanism, ostensibly aimed at Bay of Bengal surveillance but widely believed to be a front for monitoring India’s eastern borders.

How Does The Current Unrest Fit Into This Arc?

Intelligence analysts warn that the ISI’s “core mission" in Bangladesh is the systematic radicalisation of the youth and the promotion of religious extremism through groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and the Inqilab Manch. The ultimate goal appears to be the creation of a “Hybrid Regime"—modelled after Pakistan’s own political structure—that is inherently hostile to Indian interests.

The current unrest following the death of student leader Sharif Osman Hadi on December 18 is being viewed by many as a “managed" crisis. Observers argue that the resulting atmosphere of fear—marked by attacks on the Indian High Commission in Dhaka and the Assistant High Commission in Chattogram, as well as the burning of media offices like The Daily Star—is being used to delay the February 12 elections. By fostering instability, radical elements are consolidating their influence on the streets while the interim government appears either unwilling or unable to stem the tide.

Why Bangladesh’s Present Crisis Cannot Be Separated From Its Past

The turbulence unfolding in Bangladesh today is rooted in legacies that stretch back to the 1971 Liberation War. The Razakars no longer exist as an organised force, but the ideological strands, political networks and external influences that sustained them never fully disappeared. They resurfaced repeatedly over the decades and now intersect with Bangladesh’s most volatile moment in years. As Pakistan’s intelligence footprint expands once again and radical groups regain space, the shadows of 1971 are unmistakably visible in the Bangladesh of 2025.

News explainers Bangladesh On The Boil: Revisiting The Pakistani Army’s Campaign Of Violence And The Razakars

Read More